The cost sharing rule derived from the Shapley value is the unique sharing rule which uniformly divides a fixed cost.
There is a large literature on cost sharing based on solutions defined for cooperative games with transferable utility (see Moulin [1] or Young [3] ). The allocation of a fixed cost is however not explicitly addressed. Fairness suggests that a fixed cost should be uniformly allocated among players. That's what does the sharing rule derived from the Shapley value [2] . We show that it is actually the only sharing rule which does so, offering as a byproduct an axiomatization which does not require additivity nor the null player axiom.
Given a set N = {1...n} of players, a cost sharing game is defined by a cost function C which associates to each coalition S ⊂ N a cost C(S), with C(∅) = 0. The set G(N ) of cost functions defined on N is a linear space of dimension p = 2 n − 1.
A cost sharing rule is a mapping ϕ which associates to a cost function C ∈ G(N ) an allocation y = ϕ(C) ∈ IR n such that y(N ) = C(N ) and C(S) = 0 for all S ⊂ N implies ϕ(C) = 0. The sharing rule derived from the Shapley value allocates to each player a weighted sum of his/her marginal costs :
where the weights α(s) are given by
A fixed cost f which affects a coalition T is defined by :
The amount to be allocated is equal to C(N ) + f . Fairness requires that only the players who are concerned contribute and that they contribute equally :
Fairness For any cost function C ∈ G(N ), fixed cost f and subset T ,
for all i ∈ N \T Proposition The Shapley sharing rule is the unique sharing rule satisfying fairness.
The proof follows Shapley's original proof using a basis of the linear space G(N ) given by the elementary game e T defined by :
These are simple games describing decision problems where a coalition is winning if and only if it contains at least one member of T. Shapley uses simple games where players in T are veto players : a coalition is winning if and only if it contains all members of T. This give rise to a p × p matrix whose determinant is equal to 1, instead of -1 for our basis.
